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Demands for judicial accountability continue to grow worldwide. For
example, the World Bank has recently reemphasized the importance of
combating corruption. James Wolfensohn, the president of the World Bank,
stated that "[w]e need to deal with the cancer of corruption. In country after
country, people are demanding action on this issue. They know that corrup-
tion diverts resources from the poor to the rich, increases the cost of running
businesses, distorts public expenditures, and deters foreign investors."' The
World Bank has also specifically cited the need for "a fair and predictable
judicial system."2
Judicial corruption certainly exists; I know of no. country that is com-
pletely free of corruption, with its insidious effect of undermining the rule of
law. Attempts to solve judicial corruption, however, can themselves weaken
the rule of law if the judiciary comes under the influence or control of the
legislative or executive branch. The challenge to all governments, therefore,
is to eradicate judicial corruption without intruding on the independence of
the judiciary. In this Article, I discuss the problems and issues that arise in
combating judicial corruption as well as insights gained from experience in
Asia and the United States.
Senior Judge and former Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit. This Article is based on an address given before the Conference of Chief Justices
of Asia and the Pacific, Manila, Philippines, Aug. 1997. The author speaks only for him-
self, and has not sought for or received the views of his court..
1. President James D. Wolfensohn, Strategic Issues of the World Bank Group (visited
Oct. 24, 1997) <http:l/www.worldbank.orglhtml/prddr/trans/so96/art.3.htm>.
2. Rethinking the State: World Bank Says an "Effective State" Helps People and Mar-
kets Flourish (last modified June 25, 1997) <http://www.worldbank.org/extdr/extmel
1380.htm>.
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I. JUDICIAL CORRUPTION
Judicial corruption has been documented in the United States and
throughout the world.3 A United Nations report states: "[C]orruption is uni-
versal. Nowadays, all States, whether developed or developing, suffer from
the same phenomenon to varying degrees."'4 Although the vast majority of
judges with whom I have associated worldwide are hardworking, intelligent,
and honest, it is undisputed that a few judges are inappropriately influenced
in their decisionmaking. For example, three California Superior Court state
judges and an attorney were recently investigated and convicted for their in-
volvement in a corruption scheme.5 The judges received a total of $100,000
in gifts from an attorney who had cases pending before them. Prior to the
indictment, the State's Commission on Judicial Performance investigated
the judges, after which two of the judges resigned and one was removed.6 In
the end, one of the judges pled guilty pursuant to a plea bargain, and the
other two judges went to trial and were convicted and sentenced to 33 and
41 months in prison
A juror in the cases commented, "We hold judges to be above everyone
else; they sit on a pedestal."8 Judicial corruption not only knocks judges off
these perceived pedestals, but also erodes respect for law. An editorial,
calling for the judges to be sentenced to jail, stated: "We cannot stress
enough how important blind justice is to our society. If a judge can be
bought off for a few thousand dollars in car repairs and a membership to a
health club, then everybody's rights are in jeopardy because the only thing
protecting our rights is our judiciary."9 Public response to the trial provides
an important example of both the harm corruption causes the judiciary's im-
age and the need for judicial accountability.
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
In the face of the harm caused by judicial corruption, some question
3. See, e.g., U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: FINAL REPORT ON THE QUESTION OF THE IMPUNITY OF
PERPETRATORS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS),
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.21997/8 71-80 (1997) [hereinafter U.N. REPORT]; Bracy v.
Gramley, 117 S. Ct. 1793 (1997); MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT (1993).
4. U.N. REPORT 79, supra note 3.
5. Anne Krueger & Valerie Alvord, Former San Diego Judges Guilty, S.D. UN-
IoN-TRiB., Oct. 19, 1996, at A-1.
6. Anne Krueger, Court Corruption Scandal Led to Reform, S.D. UNIoN-TRIB., Oct. 20,
1996, at A-1.
7. Anne Krueger & Valerie Alvord, Two Ex-Judges, Lawyer Ordered Imprisoned, But
Remain Free, S.D. UNIoN-TRIB., Feb. 6, 1997, at A-1.
8. Leslie Wolf, Judging Former Judges Was Scary, Heart-Rending for "Common Peo-
ple," S.D. UNIoN-TRm., Oct. 19, 1996, at A-1.
9. A Subversion of Justice, S.D.UNION-TRIB., Oct. 19, 1996, at B-8.
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why judicial independence should create a barrier to any potentially effec-
tive means of ensuring judicial accountability. Judicial independence, how-
ever, should not be so lightly dismissed. It, too, is vital for preserving a
system of liberty and rule of law.
Judicial independence has been recognized as a universal human right:
"Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal. . . ."" As stated in the 1995 Principles of In-
dependence of the Judiciary, signed by thirty-four Chief Justices of Asia and
the Pacific, judicial independence requires that
(a) the Judiciary shall decide matters before it in accordance with its
impartial assessment of the facts and its understanding of the law
without improper influences, direct or indirect, from any source;
and
(b) the Judiciary has jurisdiction, directly or by way of review, over all
issues of a justiciable nature. '
So why is judicial independence so important? Maintaining an inde-
pendent judiciary is essential to the attainment of the judiciary's rule of law
governance objective and the proper performance of its functions in a free
society. 2 Such independence must be guaranteed by the State and enshrined
in the constitution or the law so that any illegal actions by the executive or
legislature can be checked. As Alexander Hamilton pointed out, limitations
on government "can be preserved in practice no other way than through the
medium of courts of justice.... Without this, all the reservations of par-
ticular rights or privileges would amount to nothing."'3
Judicial independence ensures that powerful individuals must conform
to the law; with an independent judiciary, no one is above the law and no
one is below the law. Without it, there is little hope for the rule of law. As
Lord Acton memorably stated, "Power tends to corrupt and absolute power
corrupts absolutely."'4 To restrain unauthorized exercises of power effec-
tively, judges must be beyond the reach of those who would transfer or re-
move them because of their decisions.
10. UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RiGBTs, G.A. Res. 217, art. 10 (1948); see In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, art. 14(1), 6 I.L.M.
368 (1967).
11. Principles of Independence of the Judiciary, signed by Chief Justices of Asia and
the Pacific, originally adopted in Beijing, China, in 1995 (copy on file with author).
12. See Paul Ricoeur, The Political Paradox, in LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE 250, 270
(William Connolly ed., 1984) ("The independent exercise of justice and the independent
formation of opinion are the two lungs of a politically sound state. Without these, there is
asphyxiation."); RUSSELL WHEELER, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: ITS RELATION TO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE (1988).
13. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465, 466 (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
14. BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 521:5 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992).
1998)
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Thus, the need for judicial independence is not for judges or the judici-
ary per se, but for the people. Justice Stephen Breyer explained the impor-
tance of an independent judiciary and the role of judges in the following
way:
George Washington claimed that "the [true] administration of justice is
the firmest pillar of [good] government." . ... The good that proper ad-judication can do for the justice and stability of a country is only attain-
able, however, if judges actually decide according to law, and are per-
ceived by everyone around them to be deciding according to law, rather
than according to their own whim or in compliance with the will of pow-
erful political actors. Judicial independence provides the organizing con-
cept within which we think about and develop those institutional assur-
ances that allow judges to fulfill this important social role.5
Judges' "important social role" in the preservation of liberty and the
establishment of a stable government depends on the strength of judicial in-
dependence. "[Tihough individual oppression may now and then proceed
from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people can never be en-
dangered.., so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the
legislature and the executive." 6
III. TENSION BETWEEN JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Although both judicial independence and judicial accountability are vi-
tal for maintaining the rule of law, they sometimes seem to conflict.'7 When
misconduct is alleged, there will be a demand for action against the judge in
question, just as there would be against any governmental actor. Judicial in-
dependence should not protect a judge from investigation and censure for a
valid charge; judges should not be immune from the demands of justice for
misdeeds. Indeed, there are several valid reasons for censure or removal of a
judge, such as bribery, other corruption, commission of a felony, and senil-
ity.
The issue of prime importance, therefore, is how to detect judicial cor-
ruption accurately, to investigate it fairly, and to eradicate it effectively
without eroding an independent judiciary. The executive and legislative
branches should not be able to use investigations as retaliation for unpopular
decisions or to exert subtle pressure on judges through hints or threats of in-
vestigation.
If judges are guilty of a crime, it stands to reason that they should be
15. Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 989, 996 (1996).
16. HAMILTON, supra note 13, at 466.
17. See, e.g., VOLCANSEK, supra note 3, at 2-3, 169-71.
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open to criminal prosecution the same as anyone else." But not all judicial
misconduct is criminal. Most governments have some other type of investi-
gation for lesser judicial misconduct. Various investigatory systems are pos-
sible, but I suggest that to preserve judicial independence, these investiga-
tions should be left primarily to the judicial branch. 9 Giving power to the
executive or legislative branch to investigate judges for all misconduct can
interfere with an independent judiciary. It provides too ready a tool to harass
judges whose judicial opinions are not consistent with the wishes of political
leaders.
Because judicial independence depends on the public acceptance of the
judiciary as a fair, just, and honest body, the judiciary must carefully struc-
ture its investigations to assure the public that the judiciary is taking care of
its own problems of corruption. In the end, judicial independence can be
preserved only if judges exert the moral leadership and strength of character
required to ensure judicial accountability. Benjamin Franklin's statement
applies equally to a judiciary: "Only a virtuous people are capable of free-
dom. As a nation becomes corrupt and vicious, they have more need of
masters. 20
IV. ISSUES IN STRUCTURING A WORKABLE APPROACH
While various countries can and do take differing approaches to solving
problems of judicial corruption, many common issues and questions remain.
A threshold question, for example, is how to define "corruption" or
"misconduct." In the California judges case, for example, the judge sen-
tencing the former judges pointed out that "[i]t didn't start out as a criminal
enterprise, but it escalated into that."'" The convicted lawyer was a close so-
cial friend of the judges and gave them gifts, which in the end included the
extended loan of a car, the use of a vacation home, car repairs, furniture, a
computer, and other expensive gifts.22
When does a gift or friendship become a bribe or undue influence?"
18. For a description of the process of criminal prosecution of United States judges,
see Reid H. Weingarten, Judicial Misconduct: A View From the Department of Justice, 76
KY. L.J. 799 (1988).
19. See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.03 (1995);
Howard T. Markey, Federal Judicial Ethics: Choices Made; Choices Due, in ETHICS IN THE
COURTS: POLICING BEHAVIOR IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1, 3-4 (1990).
20. AMERICA'S GOD AND COUNTRY: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUOTATIONS 247 (1994). John
Adams and Samuel Adams also identified the central need for morality to preserve liberty:
"Our Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly inadequate
to the government of any other," id. at 10, and "[n]either the wisest constitution nor the
wisest laws will secure the liberty and happiness of people whose manners are universally
corrupt." Id. at 23.
21. Supra note 7, at A-27.
22. Supra note 5, at A-10.
23. For a discussion of what constitutes bribery, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES
(1985). For a survey of cases on disqualification for bias, gifts, personal relationships, etc.,
1998]
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Should the appearance of corruption be sufficient to trigger an investigation?
I do not suggest that I have conclusive answers to these questions; every
system, however, must determine and define what behavior is serious
enough to warrant a judicial investigation and sanctions.
A related question is what instructions should be given to judges.
Judges should be given notice of what behavior is considered misconduct.
Many countries, including the United States, have written canons of ethics
or a code of judicial conduct."4 Such codes provide instructions to new
judges and can serve as bases for courses on ethics to present judges.
Because "[t]he corrupted and the corrupter are not accomplices: each is
the perpetrator of a distinct offence, subject to its own procedures and pun-
ishments," 5 the judiciary is not the only organization that can help prevent
judicial corruption. Countries should also examine the role of the bar asso-
ciations. The bar should be required to pay close attention to lawyer conduct
and determine how it can enforce ethical conduct of lawyers. Some possi-
bilities for education include requiring a lawyer ethics course in law school,
having an ethics examination before admission to the bar, and requiring the
taking of ethics courses to maintain a license to practice. The bar can also
have an investigation department within the bar association, which would
have power to disbar lawyers for unethical conduct with judges.
In addition to these basic issues, a plan to check judicial corruption
should also address (1) the role of prosecutors, (2) the role of courts,
(3) what type of accounting is required, (4) how open the process will be,
(5) how complaints should be made, (6) by whom complaints should be
made, and (7) how to check less serious but troublesome conduct.
V. APPROACHES OF COUNTRIES IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
In my work with the Conference of Chief Justices of Asia and the Pa-
cific, I have had the opportunity to conduct an informal survey of various
nations' approaches to dealing with judicial corruption. Although this sur-
vey is not intended to be a comprehensive textbook of comparative methods,
it is useful to consider various approaches and not assume that all nations
must follow a particular model.
In the over twenty responses I received from Asian and Pacific coun-
tries, most indicated that they use a combination of their chief justice and a
commission or judicial council to guard against judicial misconduct."6
see RICHARD E. FLAMm, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES 103-286 (1996).
24. E.g., YANG Di-PERTuAN AGONG, JUDGES' CODE OF ETHICS (Malaysia); CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (1997); see SHAMAN, supra note 19, § 1.02 (providing
a history of the development of the United States code).
25. U.N. REPORT at 75, supra note 3.
26. See, e.g., BASIC LAw, art. 89 (H.K); LErrmS PATENT XVIA (4)-(8) (1991) (H.K);
BANGLADESH CONST., art. 96, 116; MALAYSIA CONST., art. 125; Judicial Disciplinary Act
6
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One-fourth of the nations involve their Ministry of Justice (executive
branch)." Other responses included the use of an ombudsman and the free
press.2" Australia, Brunei, New Zealand, and Japan, like the United States,
allow judges to be removed only through impeachment.29 Slightly more than
half the countries appoint judges for life or until a fixed retirement age; the
remainder, however, appoint judges for a fixed term of years."
Virtually all of the countries have statutes or regulations establishing
the procedure to investigate, adjudicate, and take corrective measures for ju-
dicial misconduct." Although a total of 238 actions were brought for judicial
misconduct in 1996 in the twenty-one countries surveyed, one-half of the
countries reported that they had taken no action for judicial misconduct. 2 Of
the actions taken, the vast majority were for judicial incompetence-only
one was for corruption and five were for bribery.33 Most countries, although
not all, stated that they were satisfied with the current procedures.
What can be learned from the experiences of these Asian and Pacific
countries? First, the breadth of approaches reinforces the understanding that
there is not just one way to combat judicial corruption successfully. Several
countries, for example, have more than one individual or body that is in-
volved in the fight against judicial corruption. 5
Second, the fact that most countries lodge primary responsibility for in-
vestigation and action in the judicial branch further corresponds with the
importance of judicial independence. One may wonder about the one-fourth
of the countries that employ the executive branch for investigation.
Third, two-thirds of the Chief Justices are involved in guarding against
judicial corruption. 6 The involvement of a chief justice or head of a regional
(Jan. 20, 1956, stat. 381) (as amended) (Republic of Korea); SEYCHELLES CONST., art.
134(1); SINGAPORE CONST., art. 98(3), 111; PHILIPPINES CONST., art. 8, §§ 6, 11; FIJI CONST.,
art. 109; PAKISTAN CONST., art. 209; SOLOMON ISLANDS CONST. §§ 80, 87; SRI LANKA
CONST., art. 107.
27. E.g., New Zealand, Singapore, Thailand, Tonga, Vietnam (survey responses on file
with author).
28. E.g., Solomon Islands, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Brunei, Philippines (survey
responses on file with author).
29. AUSTL. CONST., art. 3, § 72(ii); Supreme Court Act § 8 (Brunei); Judicial Council
Act of 1991 (Nepal).
30. Survey responses on file with author.
31. ThE PUNJAB CIVIL SERVANT (EFFICIENCY AND DISCIPLINE) RULES, 1975 (Pakistan);
Judicial Disciplinary Act (Jan. 20, 1956, statute 381) (as amended) (Republic of Korea).
32. Survey responses on file with author.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. For example, in Australia the governor-general acts in council on an address from
both Houses of Parliament; in Singapore the Chief Justice investigates with help from the
Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau; and in New Zealand the head of a court's investi-
gations are supplemented by the police or serious fraud office if criminal conduct is in-
volved.
36. Survey responses on file with author.
1998]
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court can provide leadership as well as an opportunity to resolve problems
informally.
One troubling finding is that one-half of the surveyed countries reported
no action taken during the year. This could mean that only one-half of the
countries have any judicial corruption. But it is more likely that some coun-
tries are not being aggressive enough in rooting out corruption problems.
VI. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH
Although the United States' procedure to investigate complaints and
take action against judicial corruption has been thoroughly documented
elsewhere,37 I will provide a brief synopsis of the federal experience for
comparison. Federal judges appointed under Article III can only be
"removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason,
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Mfisdemeanors." 38 The power to impeach
a judge lies only with the House of Representatives, and only the Senate
may try the case. 9 Although Congress may remove judges, it cannot reduce
their pay during their lifetime tenures."
The United States has been successful in not only maintaining im-
peachment as the sole method of removal, but in developing a second
method to check less serious problems.4 In 1939, Congress created Judicial
Councils of the Circuits (circuit councils), a decentralized administrative
structure.42 The circuit council now consists of an equal number of trial and
appellate judges, with the circuit chief judge as chair, and has power to "take
such action as is appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious admini-
stration of the business of the courts within [its] circuit."43 Thus, the admin-
istrative power, including the power to investigate judges, was not given, to
the United States Supreme Court, the Judicial Conference of the United
States, or circuit or district courts, but to local independent administrative
37. See, e.g., Thomas E. Baker, Background Paper, in THE GOOD JUDGE: REPORT OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY 19
(1989); Russell Wheeler & A. Leo Levin, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN THE UNITED
STATES (1979); SHAMAN, supra note 19 §§ 1.04, 1.12; VOLCANSEK, supra note 3; Breyer,
supra note 15, at 992-95; Jeffrey N. Barr & Thomas E. Willging, Decentralized
Self-Regulation, Accountability, and Judicial Independence Under the Federal Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 142 U. PENN. L.R. 25 (1993).
38. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 4.
39. U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 2 & 3. For a discussion of recent Senate trials and the im-
peachment process, see VOLCANSEK, supra note 3.
40. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
41. For a general discussion of the history and functioning of the judicial councils, see
J. Clifford Wallace, Must We Have the Nunn Bill?, 51 IND. L.J. 297, 311-23 (1976). For an
evaluation of the constitutionality of forms of judicial discipline other than impeachment,
see Peter M. Shane, Who May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional
Analysis, 142 U. PENN. L. REV. 209 (1993).
42. Administrative Office Act of 1939, ch. 501, 53 Stat. 1223.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(6)(B).
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bodies comprised of judges.
Eventually, these circuit councils came under fire because they rarely
disciplined judges, even though they had the power to do so."4 In addition,
circuit councils did not resolve concerns that impeachment was a slow and
time-consuming process. In response to this criticism, Congress revised the
system of judicial accountability in 1980."5 It built on an existing statute 6
and used the existing administrative structure of circuit councils. The
amended system allowed for the correction of problems less severe than im-
peachable offenses, but preserved judicial independence by retaining inves-
tigations within the judiciary. According to the statute, the chief judge of the
circuit is responsible for screening frivolous or irrelevant complaints and has
the opportunity to take informal action.4' A comprehensive study of the 1980
Act process has shown the effectiveness of such informal action. The study
stated that one of its "most important findings" was "the continuing impor-
tance of informal approaches to judicial misconduct and disability."" If the
complaint is not frivolous, is not an issue to be resolved by appeal, and has
not become moot, the chief judge appoints a committee of circuit and dis-
trict judges to investigate the complaint and to report to the circuit council.49
The 1980 Act also provides a definition of judicial misconduct, which
is keyed to the power of circuit council. The circuit council can consider
only complaints that allege facts which show that a judge "has engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts, or alleg[e] that such a judge or magistrate is unable to
discharge all the duties of office by reason of mental or physical disabil-
ity. 5 Thus, the circuit council is not responsible for determining if judges
are involved in inappropriate conduct generally or other details of their per-
sonal lives, but whether their conduct affects the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts.
The 1980 Act also designates a procedure that can lead to impeachment.
After an investigation and a report by the circuit council, the factual record
can be submitted to Congress.5 Having a developed record should result in
Congress taking less time and make removal less cumbersome than the ear-
lier use of legislative investigations.
In 1990, Congress created the National Commission on Judicial Disci-
44. Wallace, supra note 41, at 311-23.
45. Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)) (1997).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3); see Charles Gardner Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial
Discipline, 142 U. PENN. L. REV. 243 (1993).
48. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 113
(1993); see Geyh, supra note 47.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(4).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(1).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(8).
1998]
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pline to review the effectiveness of the 1980 Act. The Commission held
hearings, conducted research, and concluded that, while some changes were
needed, the 1980 Act was successful overall.52
VII. CONCLUSION
What can be learned from the United States? Although the United
States compromise may not work in every country, certain principles emerge
from the United States experience. First, judicial corruption is enough of a
problem that some formal mechanism is necessary or at least inevitable. No
judiciary is completely immune from corruption.
A second lesson is the importance of keeping the process within the ju-
diciary. Keeping judicial oversight within the judiciary protects branch in-
dependence and ensures that judges will not face reprisals from other
branches for unpopular decisions or feel pressure to make their decisions
conform with other branches' policies.
Third, by appointing federal judges for life and preventing pay de-
creases, the United States Constitution also attempts to prevent financial
pressure on judges from other branches. A different financial pressure arises
in many countries, however, from unreasonably low pay for judges. The
likelihood of corruption is increased when judges are not adequately com-
pensated by the State.
Fourth, the United States system usefully focuses challenges to judges'
behavior on whether the court system is prejudiced, which avoids
witch-hunts into judges' private lives and keeps the process objective. The
United States experience also points out the need for both a system to re-
move judges for offenses such as bribery as well as a system for correcting
conduct less than a removable offense.
Fifth, the United States has chosen to retain regional control over judi-
cial misconduct. Allowing the system to function at the lowest practical
level prevents the accumulation of power in one judge or one central body.
Regional devolution of power also allows for informal solutions by local
chief judges, which the system should encourage. The commission studying
the 1980 Act stated: "The continuing success of informal approaches is due
52. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL Dis-
CIPLINE AND REMOVAL 9, 11-12 (1993); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL (1993); see also Barr & Willging, supra note 37 (containing re-
port prepared for the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal generally
supporting the Act). The 1980 Act has been extensively debated and discussed. See, e.g.,
Baker, supra note 37, at 3-15; Stephen B. Burbank, Alternative Career Resolution: An Es-
say on the Removal of Federal Judges, 76 KY. L.J. 643 (1987-88); Elena Ruth Sassower,
Without Merit: The Empty Promise of Judicial Discipline, 4 THE LONG TERM VIEW 90, 92-
95 (1997); Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.J. 1117 (1984-85). The 1980 Act has also
been upheld in court, Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States, 593 F. Supp.
1371 (1984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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in large part to the system of decentralized self-regulation. ... ""
Taken together, these principles suggest that an effective system should
have a process in addition to removal with provision for lay as well as law-
yer and judge complaints, managed not by an interbranch commission, but
by a permanent organization of judicial peers. Most important, any such
council or judicial commission should not interfere with the independence of
the judiciary. In this way, the rule of law can be preserved by combating
corruption without diminishing judicial independence.
53. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL 113(1993).
19981
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